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RULES AND STANDARDS IN JUSTICE SCALIA’S 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Robert M. Bloom *                 
Eliza S. Walker ** 
 INTRODUCTION 
When looking at Justice Scalia’s approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment, most would say he was an originalist and a textualist.1 Jus-
tice Scalia himself would like to explain, “I’m an originalist and a 
textualist, not a nut.”2 Although originalism and textualism were 
often prevalent in his Fourth Amendment decisions, even more im-
portant to his decision-making was his disdain for judicial activ-
ism.3 To limit judicial discretion, Justice Scalia frequently opted to 
 
*     Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
   **   J.D., 2020, Boston College Law School; Law Clerk, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
 1. See, e.g., DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT’S ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 12 (2018) (“Scalia made a career of preaching 
‘originalism’ and ‘textualism.’”); Timothy C. MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amend-
ment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 
175 (2015) (examining Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment opinions where he employs 
originalism and textualism). Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation based 
on the idea that words have fixed meanings and should be understood the way they were 
understood at the time of the framing. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78–92, 435 (2012). Textualism is the theory of 
interpreting the Constitution based only on what the text says and fairly implies. See id. at 
xxvii, 16. 
 2. Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NPR (Apr. 28, 2008, 
7:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017 [https://perma. 
cc/L62G-DE37]. 
 3. Professor John Manning makes this argument with respect to Justice Scalia’s over-
all jurisprudence. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 748 (2017); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 78 (1992) (“In other words, for Justice Scalia, 
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impose bright-line rules rather than vague standards.4 This is ap-
parent not only within his jurisprudence as a whole, but also spe-
cifically in his Fourth Amendment decisions.5  
In his article Originalism: The Lesser Evil, Justice Scalia de-
nounced nonoriginalists because their approach invites judicial ac-
tivism.6 Though Scalia acknowledged that originalism had its de-
fects,7 he argued that it was strongly preferable to nonoriginalism 
because it constrained a judge’s ability to impose his or her own 
moral or political values onto the law.8 Making decisions about cur-
rent social values, Scalia argued, was better left to the elected leg-
islature.9 Originalism was superior because it required judges to 
justify their rulings with something external to themselves.10 
In his book A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia further dis-
paraged the common law—or as he would call it, judge-made law.11 
 
the rule’s the thing; originalism and traditionalism are means, not ends.”). 
 4. Stephen G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 483, 486 (2014) (discussing Scalia’s preference for rules). 
 5. Professor Orin Kerr, in a panel discussion at the 2016 Federalist Society National 
Lawyers Convention, noted that Justice Scalia’s impact on Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence has been partially overlooked. See David Stras, Orin Kerr, Rachel Barkow, Stephanos 
Bibas & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Justice Scalia and the Criminal Law, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 743, 
744 (2018). 
 6. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (“The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my 
view, is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of consti-
tutionality.”). 
 7. In 1989 Scalia admitted that he might be merely a “faint-hearted originalist” be-
cause he could not imagine himself upholding a statute requiring flogging—even though it 
would have been upheld in 1791. Id. at 864. By 2013, though, his faint-heartedness had 
receded. In an interview with New York magazine, he stated that he would, in fact, uphold 
a law permitting flogging because though “it is immensely stupid . . . it is not unconstitu-
tional.” Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, NEW YORK (Oct. 4, 2013), 
https://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ [https://perma.cc/2PKG-W2F4]. 
Instead of faint-hearted, he now referred to himself as an honest originalist—that is, one 
who “take[s] the bitter with the sweet.” Id. 
 8. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 863 (“It is very difficult for a person to discern 
a difference between those political values that he personally thinks most important, and 
those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’”). 
 9. Id. at 854. 
 10. Id. at 864 (“Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system, 
for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the prefer-
ences of the judge himself.”). 
 11. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 4 
(1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] (noting that the common law does not neces-
sarily reflect people’s practices but is rather law created by judges). 
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Describing a first-year law school class discussing a series of hypo-
theticals, he wrote mockingly, “What intellectual fun all of this 
is!”12 He noted law school is exhilarating because it consists of 
“playing king”—that is, playing common-law judge—by deciding 
how and what the law should be.13 All of this would be well and 
good, Scalia said, if it weren’t for a little thing called democracy.14 
In the criminal context, one justification for choosing between a 
standard and a rule is the need to safeguard the rights of unpopu-
lar criminal defendants.15 Justice Scalia discussed this issue in The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. He wrote that one of the utilities of 
bright-line rules was that they allowed judges to serve counterma-
joritarian interests.16 Firm rules are most important, he said, in 
cases where the popular will might come out the other way:  
It is very difficult to say that a particular convicted felon who is the 
object of widespread hatred must go free because, on balance, we think 
that excluding the defense attorney from the line-up process in this 
case may have prevented a fair trial. It is easier to say that our cases 
plainly hold that, absent exigent circumstances, such exclusion is a 
per se denial of due process.17 
Bright-line rules, Scalia argued, allowed judges to be “coura-
geous”—that is, to stand up to “occasional excesses of [the] popular 
will.”18 
Justice Scalia didn’t only condemn judicial activism in his extra-
curricular writing, but also—often quite sharply—in his decisions. 
In his dissent in Dickerson v. United States, for example, he re-
 
 12. Id. at 7. 
 13. Id. (“[First-year law school] consists of playing king—devising, out of the brilliance 
of one’s own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind. How exciting! And no wonder 
so many law students, having drunk at this intoxicating well, aspire for the rest of their 
lives to be judges!”). 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the 
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1189 (1988) 
(arguing that Fourth Amendment cases that use balancing tests deserve increased scrutiny 
to properly protect the rights of unpopular criminal defendants). 
 16. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Law of Rules]. 
 17. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)). Justice Scalia expressed a 
similar sentiment in Arizona v. Hicks, when he stated that “the Constitution sometimes 
insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.” 480 U.S. 321, 329 
(1987). 
 18. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1180. 
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buked the majority for holding that the rule from Miranda v. Ari-
zona was constitutional and therefore could not be superseded by 
Congress.19 The Miranda decision, Scalia argued, was pure judicial 
activism: it was in no way required by the Constitution.20 He ac-
cused the majority of violating the separation of powers and be-
coming “some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or 
thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends 
its collective fancy.”21 Justice Scalia’s concern with judicial discre-
tion also manifested in his theory of statutory interpretation. For 
example, in Zuni Public School District Number 89 v. Department 
of Education, he dissented, berating the majority for purporting to 
interpret “unenacted congressional intent.”22 He characterized the 
majority’s theory of statutory interpretation as “sheer applesauce,” 
and voiced his concern that when a judge purports to interpret con-
gressional intent, the interpretation tends to have a remarkable 
similarity to whatever judges think Congress should have meant.23 
Though Zuni Public School District dealt with per-pupil expendi-
tures—a relatively apolitical issue—Justice Scalia noted his con-
cern with the impact that interpreting so-called congressional in-
tent would have in cases “more likely to arouse the judicial libido” 
such as voting rights or antidiscrimination.24 He preferred bright-
line rules that would restrict judges’ ability to impose their own 
morals, ethics, and politics onto the law.25 
 
 19. 530 U.S. 428, 445–46 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 20. See id. at 448–49. 
 21. Id. at 455. He called the majority opinion “antidemocratic” and wrote that it “con-
verts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops’ Pyramid (or 
perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance.” Id. at 446, 465. 
 22. 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 113, 117. 
 24. Id. at 118. 
 25. Justice Scalia further criticized activist judging in the civil procedure context in 
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990). Writing for the plurality, he de-
nounced Justice Brennan’s concurrence for relying on “contemporary notions of due pro-
cess.” Id. He argued that this formulation gave judges license to break with the test of “tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and replace it with merely their notions 
of fair play and substantial justice. Id. In his formulation he focused on the term “tradition” 
to argue for a historical approach. Id. at 621. He thought we should formulate rules of juris-
diction the way we have always done it. See id. 
BLOOM 553 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2021  9:09 AM 
2021] RULES AND STANDARDS  717 
 
This Article examines Justice Scalia’s effort to limit judicial dis-
cretion through the lens of the debate between rules and stand-
ards.26 It is the first article to situate Scalia’s goal of limited dis-
cretion within the framework of the debate between rules and 
standards, as well as the first to discuss this issue specifically with 
respect to his Fourth Amendment decisions.27 Rules are binding 
directives that leave little room for considering the specific facts of 
any given situation.28 Critics argue that they tend to be over- or 
under-inclusive, but the value of rules is that by taking power away 
from the decisionmaker, they limit judicial discretion.29 Further, 
some argue that rules promote democracy because they properly 
leave the power to make decisions based on politics or value judg-
ments to the legislature.30 On the flip side, proponents of standards 
argue that standards produce judgments that are less arbitrary 
and more substantively fair because they allow decisionmakers to 
consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.31  
 
 26. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 57–121 (outlining the debate between rules and stand-
ards as a debate around how much discretion judges should have and by what means courts 
should keep discretion in check). Professor Kathryn Urbonya has analyzed the implications 
of how modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence vacillates between rules and standards. 
See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme 
Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1387–89 (2003). 
 27. Other scholars have analyzed Justice Scalia’s interest in judicial restraint in his 
jurisprudence writ large, but to our knowledge no one has situated it within the framework 
of rules and standards. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 3, at 748–50 (discussing what he calls 
Scalia’s “anti-discretion principle”); Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4 (critiquing Justice 
Scalia’s preference for rules from an originalist perspective); David A. Strauss, On the 
Origin of Rules (with Apologies to Darwin): A Comment on Antonin Scalia’s The Rule of Law 
as a Law of Rules, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 997 (2008) (discussing Scalia’s preference for rules). 
Further, various scholars have discussed Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
yet have not specifically analyzed his preference for rules in the Fourth Amendment. See, 
e.g., MacDonnell, supra note 1 (analyzing Scalia’s Fourth Amendment decisions through an 
originalist and textualist lens); Steven Wisotsky, The Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence of 
Justice Scalia, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 531 (2016) (cataloging and summarizing all of Scalia’s 
Fourth Amendment decisions); see generally Stras et al., supra note 5, at 744 (panel discus-
sion where Professor Orin Kerr argued that the two broad themes in Scalia’s jurisprudence 
were originalism and limiting judicial discretion). 
 28. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 58. 
 29. Id. at 62–66 (listing arguments for rules as fairness as formal equality, utility, lib-
erty, and democracy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, 369 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[B]alancing tests amount to brief nods by the 
Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an 
unanalyzed exercise of judicial will.”). 
 30. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 64–65. 
 31. Id. at 66–69 (listing arguments in favor of standards as fairness as substantive jus-
tice, utility, equality, and deliberation). 
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Justice Scalia has been called the leading supporter of the 
“rules-as-democracy argument.”32 He argued that rules were pref-
erable because they are more likely to ensure equal treatment 
among like cases, they make the law clear in a system where the 
Supreme Court can review only a small number of cases, and they 
ensure predictability.33  
How does this philosophy of limited judicial discretion manifest 
in the Fourth Amendment context? Because the Fourth Amend-
ment specifically prohibits “unreasonable” searches—which argu-
ably dictates a standard—Justice Scalia often sought to construct 
rules that could curb a limitless interpretation of “unreasonable.”34 
Further, the Fourth Amendment context is unique because of the 
strong interest for police to have intelligible rules dictating the 
scope of any potential search.35  
In criminal Fourth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia usually ap-
plied rules.36 He noted that rules allowed judges to serve counter-
majoritarian interests by protecting the rights of unpopular crimi-
nal defendants.37 However, Scalia occasionally strayed from his 
rules-oriented philosophy and applied a standard.38 This was espe-
cially true in cases involving civil special needs as well as cases 
dealing with remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.39 At-
tempts to classify Justice Scalia as favoring the government or fa-
voring individual Fourth Amendment rights are fraught with dif-
ficulty. It is probably best to characterize him as in favor of rules 
in the criminal context, and in favor of standards in other contexts. 
 
 32. Id. at 65. 
 33. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1178–79. He stated that sometimes “even 
a bad rule is better than no rule at all.” Id. at 1179. He argued that general rules that 
constrain judges are good—not only because they constrain lower courts, but also because 
they constrain future Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 1179–80. 
 34. See infra section I.B.2. 
 35. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 203, 206 (2013) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting the importance of workable rules for police). But see New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 463, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s imposi-
tion of a bright-line rule because “the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more 
efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment” (quoting Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978))). 
 36. See infra Part I. 
 37. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1180. 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. See infra Part II. 
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Part I of this Article discusses Scalia’s Fourth Amendment cases 
in the criminal context.40 It first discusses his methodology when 
approaching Fourth Amendment cases, and then outlines the cases 
where he advocated for bright-line rules that would limit judicial 
discretion.41 Part II demonstrates his departure from the rules ap-
proach in civil special needs cases and cases involving remedies for 
Fourth Amendment violations.42 
I.  RULES: “FIRM BUT ALSO BRIGHT”43 
In his Fourth Amendment decisions, Justice Scalia favored 
bright-line rules that would limit judicial discretion. He spoke fre-
quently about the need to root decisions in something external to a 
judge’s own political predilections.44 In his Fourth Amendment 
cases, he rooted his bright-line rules in probable cause, textualism, 
and originalism.45 
Section A of this Part outlines Justice Scalia’s basic Fourth 
Amendment philosophy.46 Section B discusses the relationship be-
tween the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment and lays out what 
we will call Scalia’s “probable cause presumption.”47 Section C 
looks at cases where Justice Scalia used originalism and textual-
ism to limit judicial discretion.48 Finally, Section D discusses Jus-
tice Scalia’s revival of the trespass test for when a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has occurred, and discusses its lasting legacy as the 
Court grapples with how to apply the Fourth Amendment in the 
digital age.49 
 
 40. See infra Part I. 
 41. See infra Part I. 
 42. See infra Part II. 
 43. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“That line . . . must not only be 
firm but also bright.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 864. 
 45. See infra Part I. 
 46. See infra section I.A. 
 47. See infra section I.B. 
 48. See infra section I.C. 
 49. See infra section I.D. 
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A.  Basic Fourth Amendment Philosophy 
Justice Scalia hated Fourth Amendment cases.50 He did not like 
the often fact-specific inquiry of determining what was “reasona-
ble,” but because the Constitution specifically prohibits “unreason-
able” searches, as a textualist he could not avoid it.51 He preferred 
to leave lower courts to determine “reasonableness,” and wrote 
that the Supreme Court should only take Fourth Amendment cases 
periodically to indicate the limits of acceptable variation.52 
Justice Scalia prescribed a two-step analysis for Fourth Amend-
ment cases:  
[W]e inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful 
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was 
framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the 
search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by as-
sessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an in-
dividual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed 
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.53 
In other words, first he asked whether there was an analogous 
practice when the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791.54 If so, 
then that answer remains true today. On the other hand, for novel 
questions where there was no equivalent practice in 1791, the 
 
 50. See Stras et al., supra note 5, at 744 (citing Interview by Susan Swain with Antonin 
Scalia, in Washington, D.C. (June 19, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?286079-1/su 
preme-court-justice-scalia [https://perma.cc/U4T2-KYCZ] (“I just hate Fourth Amendment 
cases. It’s almost a jury question, you know, whether this variation is an unreasonable 
search or seizure. It’s variation 3,542. Yes, I’ll write the opinion, but I don’t consider it a 
plum.”)). 
 51. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Other legal standards that use “reasonableness,” like 
the “reasonable man” in torts or the “reasonable expectation of privacy” from Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), are not specifically prescribed 
by the Constitution. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1181–82 (discussing the 
differences between the “reasonable man” and “reasonable search” analyses); infra section 
I.D (discussing the Katz test). 
 52. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1186. 
 53. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To determine what is an ‘unreasonable’ search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the historical practices the 
Framers sought to preserve; if those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional 
standards of reasonableness.”). 
 54. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“There is assuredly room for such an approach in resolving novel questions of search 
and seizure under the ‘reasonableness’ standard that the Fourth Amendment sets forth. But 
not, I think, in resolving those questions in which a clear answer already existed in 1791 
and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of society ever since.”). 
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Court should apply “traditional standards of reasonableness” by 
balancing the degree of privacy intrusion against the governmen-
tal interest.55  
This balancing should ostensibly be geared towards what would 
have been “reasonable” in 1791, not merely what is expedient to-
day.56 Justice Scalia believed that the Fourth Amendment must 
protect the same degree of privacy that was protected in 1791, re-
gardless of what new ways technology has found to invade our pri-
vacy.57 To determine whether a novel type of search or seizure is 
“reasonable” requires balancing the competing concerns of the pri-
vacy interests of individuals versus the needs of law enforcement.58 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia limited his use of the balancing ap-
proach to civil special needs cases and cases involving remedies for 
Fourth Amendment violations.59 In criminal cases, he would often 
turn to the second clause of the Fourth Amendment to help him 
 
 55. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. Justice Stevens criticized this approach in his dis-
sent in Wyoming v. Houghton. Id. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued: “[W]e have 
never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy 
and governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law 
‘yields no answer.’ Neither the precedent cited by the Court, nor the majority’s opinion in 
this case, mandate that approach.” Id. 
 56. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting 
that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures “is to be 
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was 
adopted” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925))); see also Lawrence 
Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence During the Career of Justice Scalia, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 90–91 (2018) (discussing 
the original public meaning of “unreasonable”). 
 57. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, [the Court] must ‘as-
sur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))); 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the provision, in other 
words, is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability 
of their property that existed when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less virtuous 
age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’”); California 
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded.”). 
 58. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“In determining the reasonableness of 
the manner in which a seizure is effected, ‘we must balance the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) 
(“[W]here there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search 
at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search 
meets the reasonableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” 
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))). 
 59. See infra Part II. 
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define the vague term “unreasonable.”60 In this way he often looked 
to the probable cause standard in the second clause to give mean-
ing to the term “unreasonable” in the first.61 
An example of Justice Scalia’s two-step approach can be found 
in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin.62 There, Justice Scalia based 
his opinion in the first part of the two-step analysis.63 He dissented, 
berating the majority for engaging in a balancing test even though 
a clear answer existed in 1791.64 In that case, the majority held 
that someone who is arrested without a warrant must be brought 
in front of a judge no later than 48 hours after the arrest.65 Justice 
Scalia criticized the majority for engaging in a balancing test—be-
tween public safety on the one hand, and the need to avoid pro-
longed detention on the other—when a clear answer existed in 
1791.66 In 1791, Scalia said, a suspect arrested without a warrant 
was required to be put in front of a magistrate “as soon as he rea-
sonably can.”67 Scalia argued that different courts would strike the 
balance in different ways, and that the Fourth Amendment served 
to “put this matter beyond time, place, and judicial predilection.”68 
Justice Scalia favored bright-line rules because they limited ju-
dicial discretion. But not just any bright-line rule would do.69 The 
rule needed to be faithful to the text of the Constitution and based 
on something external to the judge’s own will.70 In McLaughlin, 
 
 60. See infra section I.B.2. 
 61. See infra section I.B.2. 
 62. 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 56 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 61 (citing 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95 n.13 (1847)). 
 68. Id. at 65, 66. 
 69. Professor Manning argued that contrary to popular opinion, Justice Scalia did not 
care only about rules qua rules. Manning, supra note 3, at 748–49. Rather, his philosophy 
was based more deeply on the insistence that judges must justify their decisions on some-
thing external to their own wills. See id. 
 70. See id. at 770. For an example outside of the Fourth Amendment context, see Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). There, Justice Scalia 
sharply criticized a bright-line rule—the requirement of Miranda warnings—because he 
found it had no basis in the text or history of the Constitution. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 
450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). He argued that 
the clear rule from Miranda was no easier to apply than a totality of the circumstances test. 
See id. at 463 (“It is not immediately apparent, however, that the judicial burden has been 
eased by the ‘bright-line’ rules adopted in Miranda . . . Moreover, it is not clear why the 
Court thinks that the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ test . . . is more difficult than Miranda 
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the majority’s judgment was indeed a bright-line rule, but it was a 
rule that was not faithful to the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion: the 48-hour rule conflicted with the practices used at the time 
the Fourth Amendment was enacted.71 Thus, Scalia criticized it, 
finding that it eliminated a right that existed at the time of the 
framing.72  
Justice Scalia touched on this distinction in his essay The Rule 
of Law as a Law of Rules.73 He noted that it was possible to estab-
lish a general rule that was not based on something external to the 
judges’ own wills, but only because “with five votes anything is pos-
sible.”74 He found that if a general rule was not based on a “solid 
textual anchor or an established social norm” then there was no 
difference between it and rule-making properly done by the legis-
lature.75 
B.  Limited Reasonableness: The Warrant & Probable Cause 
Presumptions 
1.  The Warrant Presumption 
A critical issue for interpreting the Fourth Amendment is 
whether its two clauses should be read separately or together.76 
The first clause dictates the right to be free from “unreasonable” 
searches and seizures and the second clause states that “no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”77 The traditional view 
was that the second clause gave meaning to the first: a search with-
out a warrant was presumptively unreasonable.78 This view is also 
 
for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”). 
 71. 500 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. (arguing that the majority opinion “eliminates a very old right indeed”). 
 73. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1184–85. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1185. 
 76. See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POLICE 12 (9th ed. 2020); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, An Examination 
of the Coherence of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275, 
279–80 (2016). 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a comprehensive analysis of the two views of the Fourth 
Amendment, see Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468 (1985). 
 78. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1985) (calling this reading the “conventional interpretation”). 
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referred to as the “warrant preference” school of interpretation.79 
It is exhibited in the frequently cited line from Katz v. United 
States, a Warren Court decision, where the Court stated that war-
rantless searches were “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”80 
The Warren Court preference for a warrant was later displaced 
by the Burger Court’s approach, which expanded on existing ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement.81 In his 1991 concurrence in 
California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia noted that the warrant re-
quirement now contained so many exceptions that it was practi-
cally unrecognizable.82 He noted that while it was “textually possi-
ble” that the word “unreasonable” implicitly contained the 
requirement of a warrant, the general rule requiring a warrant in 
all circumstances had no basis in the common law.83 This view is 
often referred to as the “reasonableness” school of interpretation.84 
A majority of the Court has, at times, adopted this view, stating 
that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is merely “reasona-
bleness.”85 Under this view, the Warrant Clause does not modify 
 
 79. See, e.g., BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 76, at 12. 
 80. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 81. See Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement—The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 691, 693 (1982); see also Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the 
Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1026–27 
(2001) (noting that the Court began to stray from the warrant preference view in the 1990s). 
 82. 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing exceptions including 
“searches incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] 
incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat boarding for document 
checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es] 
. . . .” (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1773–74 (1985))). 
 83. Id. at 582–84. 
 84. See, e.g., BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 76, at 12. An early expression of the reason-
ableness school appears in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (“A rule 
of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be 
appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this 
requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search . . 
. . The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether 
the search was reasonable.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touch-
stone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 
(2009) (“The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, we have often said, is ‘reason-
ableness.’”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“Nevertheless, because the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement 
is subject to certain exceptions.”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“[The 
Fourth Amendment’s] ‘central requirement’ is one of reasonableness.” (quoting Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983))). 
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the Reasonableness Clause; the Warrant Clause solely lays out the 
requirements of a valid warrant.86 Various critics have stated that 
Justice Scalia endorsed the “reasonableness” school of interpreta-
tion.87 
As evidence, these critics cite the fact that, in 2004, Justice 
Scalia signed on to Justice Thomas’s dissent in Groh v. Ramirez, 
which endorsed the reasonableness school.88 There, a federal agent 
applied for a warrant to search a large ranch in Montana, but did 
not properly list with particularity the items he intended to seize.89 
The majority held that the warrant was plainly invalid because it 
did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.90 
It stated that because the warrant was so obviously defective, the 
search was essentially warrantless.91 It adopted the “warrant pref-
erence” view of the Fourth Amendment, stating that warrantless 
searches were presumptively unreasonable.92 Thus, it held that the 
search at issue in the case was unreasonable.93  
Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, arguing against 
the warrant presumption.94 Justice Thomas cited a long line of 
cases vacillating between requiring a warrant and recognizing 
some exception to the warrant requirement.95 He wrote that 
though the precise relationship between the clauses was not cer-
tain, neither clause explicitly required a warrant.96 He followed the 
 
 86. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 76, at 279–80. 
 87. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 194–95 (noting that Scalia believed the Fourth 
Amendment did not contain a warrant presumption); Seamon, supra note 81, at 1026–29 
(noting that Scalia has played a “major role” in the trend away from a broad warrant pre-
sumption). Each of these analyses, though, was published before Scalia’s 2015 dissent in 
Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015), which provides greater clarity on his view of the 
relationship between the two clauses. 
 88. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571, 573–74 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 199. 
 89. Groh, 540 U.S. at 554. The application for the warrant listed various types of weap-
ons and was supported with a detailed affidavit. Id. The warrant itself, however, was much 
less specific: it described only the house the agent intended to search, but did not describe 
the weapons he intended to seize. Id. It did not incorporate by reference the detailed list of 
weapons he had provided in the warrant application. Id. at 554–55. 
 90. Id. at 557. Though the application listed the “things to be seized,” that did not rescue 
the warrant from the failure. Id. 
 91. Id. at 559. 
 92. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). 
 93. Id. at 563. 
 94. Id. at 571, 573–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 572–73. 
 96. Id. at 571. 
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reasonableness school and argued that the search in the case had 
been reasonable, and therefore was constitutional.97 
Justice Scalia’s own views on the warrant presumption, how-
ever, were slightly more nuanced. In his 2015 dissent in City of Los 
Angeles v. Patel, Justice Scalia expounded on the relationship be-
tween the two clauses.98 There, a group of motel operators in Cali-
fornia facially challenged a municipal code that required hotel op-
erators to keep records with identifying information about their 
guests and let police officers inspect the records on demand.99 The 
majority held that the statute was facially unconstitutional be-
cause it did not afford an opportunity for motel operators to seek 
judicial review before being required to turn over requested rec-
ords.100 It adopted the warrant preference interpretation, citing the 
clause in Katz stating that warrantless searches were “per se un-
reasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”101 The search at issue did not comply 
with the requirements of the administrative search exception be-
cause it did not provide an option for precompliance review, and 
thus the Court struck it down.102 
Justice Scalia dissented. He argued that the touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment was “reasonableness” and that the search at 
issue was reasonable because it was constitutional in almost every 
instance.103 Despite appearing to endorse the reasonableness 
school of interpretation, though, Justice Scalia suggested that two 
clauses of the Fourth Amendment were not wholly separate:  
Grammatically, the two clauses of the Amendment seem to be inde-
pendent—and directed at entirely different actors. The former tells 
the executive what it must do when it conducts a search, and the latter 
tells the judiciary what it must do when it issues a search warrant. 
But in an effort to guide courts in applying the Search-and-Seizure 
Clause’s indeterminate reasonableness standard, and to maintain co-
herence in our case law, we have used the Warrant Clause as a guide-
post for assessing the reasonableness of a search, and have erected a 
 
 97. Id. at 573. 
 98. 576 U.S. 409, 428, 430–31 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 412–13 (majority opinion). 
 100. Id. at 418. The statute provided that hotel operators who did not comply with police 
requests could be arrested on the spot. Id. at 421. 
 101. Id. at 419 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
 102. Id. at 421. 
 103. Id. at 430–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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framework of presumptions applicable to broad categories of searches 
conducted by executive officials. Our case law has repeatedly recog-
nized, however, that these are mere presumptions, and the only con-
stitutional requirement is that a search be reasonable.104 
Though Scalia argued that the clauses were technically separate, 
he stated that the second one was a “guidepost” to understand the 
word “reasonableness” in the first.105 Justice Scalia did not believe 
in a warrant requirement, but appeared—at least at the end of his 
career—to believe in a warrant presumption.106 
A warrant presumption, though, does not add much utility in 
crafting bright-line rules because there are so many exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.107 In 1991, Justice Scalia wrote that the 
warrant requirement “had become so riddled with exceptions that 
it was basically unrecognizable.”108 It has essentially reached the 
point that it is no longer a rule at all, but rather a standard.109 
Nevertheless, in his concurrence in Bailey v. United States, Jus-
tice Scalia argued that extending an exception to the warrant re-
quirement should be limited.110 He argued that the categorical 
bright-line rule which allowed for the temporary detention of occu-
pants during the execution of a search warrant should not be ex-
tended to include an occupant who had recently left the prem-
ises.111 He quoted the language of Michigan v. Summers, stating 
that, “If police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the com-
peting interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical 
basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police 
officers.’”112 
 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing the following 
exceptions to the warrant requirement: searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, 
searches of “pervasively regulated” businesses, administrative searches, exigent circum-
stances, mobile home searches, inventory searches, border searches). 
 108. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 109. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 58 n.231 (noting that the difference between rules and 
standards is a continuum, not a divide; at some point a rule can have so many exceptions 
that it becomes a standard). 
 110. 568 U.S. 186, 203 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 111. Id. at 204. 
 112. Id. at 206 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)). 
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2.  The Probable Cause Presumption 
The warrant presumption is not the only part of the second 
clause that Justice Scalia appears to read into the word “reasona-
bleness.” Many of his cases evince what we will call a “probable 
cause presumption”: often, when deciding whether a search is rea-
sonable, Justice Scalia based his decision on whether there was 
probable cause. This method gave him a benchmark with which to 
craft bright-line rules. 
As with the notion of warrants, from the second clause, Justice 
Scalia appeared not to believe in a probable cause requirement, but 
rather a probable cause presumption.113 He acknowledged that 
there were categories of cases, such as administrative searches, 
that required less justification than probable cause.114 And yet in 
the criminal context, Justice Scalia chose to root his analysis in 
probable cause again and again. If there was probable cause, he 
declined to engage in a balancing analysis and found the search 
was “ipso facto” reasonable.115 This strategy facilitated making 
bright-line rules that limited judicial discretion.  
For example, in Arizona v. Hicks, Justice Scalia rooted his opin-
ion in the need for probable cause.116 In that case, a bullet was fired 
through the floor of James Hicks’s apartment.117 Police entered 
without a warrant to search for the shooter, and found and seized 
three weapons.118 While in the apartment, one of the officers ob-
served some expensive stereo equipment, which he deemed out of 
 
 113. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 431 (2015). The probable cause presumption 
should be distinguished from the probable cause requirement, which various scholars have 
examined. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 78, at 304–09. The probable cause requirement 
is the idea that even warrantless searches must have probable cause to be reasonable. Id. 
Under this view, the real harm the Framers sought to protect against was not warrantless 
searches, but rather searches done without probable cause. Id. Professor Akhil Reed Amar 
has criticized this view. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 782–85 (1994). He argued the idea of a probable cause requirement was 
nonsensical both because it is not textually required by the words of the Fourth Amendment, 
and because there are numerous searches for which probable cause is not required, such as 
consent searches, administrative searches, and weapons pat-downs. Id. at 783. 
 114. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 430–31. 
 115. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 116. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). Professor Kannar provided a valuable analysis of Hicks in his 
1990 article The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia. See George Kannar, The Con-
stitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1324–28 (1990). 
 117. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. 
 118. Id. at 323–34. 
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place in the otherwise “squalid” apartment.119 To determine if the 
equipment was stolen, the officer moved the stereo slightly so he 
could record its serial number.120 He reported the serial number to 
police headquarters by phone, was advised that some of the equip-
ment had been stolen in a recent armed robbery, and seized it.121 
Justice Scalia noted that though the officer had lawfully entered 
the apartment pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, 
moving the equipment to inspect the serial number was an unre-
lated “search.”122 And that search required probable cause.123 
The dissents made policy arguments: Justice Powell argued that 
the distinction between “merely looking at” an item in plain view 
and slightly moving it was trivial.124 Justice O’Connor argued that 
the case presented a mere “cursory inspection” and not a “full-
blown search” and balanced the government and individual inter-
ests to find that it was justified.125 She accused Justice Scalia of 
ignoring precedent and placing serious constraints on law enforce-
ment in order to establish a bright-line rule—something which, she 
argued, had only theoretical advantages.126 
In response, Justice Scalia stated that the standard Justice 
O’Connor proposed would “send police and judges into a new 
thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain 
description that is neither a ‘plain view’ inspection nor yet a ‘full-
blown search.’”127 “A search is a search,” he wrote, “even if it hap-
pens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.”128 He re-
sisted the use of any policy-inflected balancing tests, even acknowl-
edging that there might have been no lawful way for the officer to 
have ascertained whether the equipment was stolen if he did not 
have probable cause.129 “[T]here is nothing new,” he wrote, “in the 
 
 119. Id. at 323. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 324–25. 
 123. Id. at 324–26. 
 124. Id. at 328, 333 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 335 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 339. 
 127. Id. at 328–29 (majority opinion). 
 128. Id. at 325. 
 129. Id. at 329. 
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realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the crimi-
nality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”130 Instead 
of allowing Justice O’Connor’s flexible standard of something less 
than a “search” that would require some lesser justification, Jus-
tice Scalia firmly rooted his bright-line rule in the requirement of 
probable cause. 
Similarly, in California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia again rooted 
his decision in probable cause presumption.131 There, officers ob-
served a man leaving an apartment known to contain multiple 
packages of marijuana.132 The man carried a paper bag, got into 
his car, and began to drive away.133 Officers stopped and searched 
the man’s car—including the paper bag—where they found mari-
juana.134 The majority found that the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement applied to this search, and therefore it was 
lawful.135 It eliminated any separate container analysis, noting 
that a clear-cut rule was preferable: police officers can search 
cars—including containers therein—without a warrant if they 
have probable cause.136 The majority endorsed the warrant prefer-
ence interpretation in dicta, noting that the automobile exception 
was merely one of the “specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”137 
Justice Scalia concurred, but disagreed with the majority’s war-
rant preference approach.138 He stated that the Fourth Amend-
ment contains no warrant requirement; it merely prohibits “unrea-
sonable” searches.139 He acknowledged that it was “textually 
possible” to consider that the word “unreasonable” implicitly con-
tained the requirement of a warrant.140 But, he noted that the 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. 500 U.S. 565, 581–85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 567 (majority opinion). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 579–80. The majority held that there was no distinction between a standard 
search of a vehicle, and a search of the closed containers within that vehicle. Id. So long as 
there was probable cause to justify the search, each is constitutional. Id. 
 136. Id. at 579. 
 137. Id. at 580. 
 138. Id. at 581–85 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. at 581 (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant 
for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasona-
ble.’”). 
 140. Id. at 582. 
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Court had “lurched back and forth” between the two views, such 
that the “warrant requirement” was so “riddled with exceptions 
that it was basically unrecognizable.”141 He went on to say that a 
general rule requiring a warrant in all circumstances had no basis 
in the common law.142 Like in Hicks, Justice Scalia allowed a war-
rantless search so long as it was based upon probable cause.143 
Though he professed to adopt the view that the clauses were sepa-
rate, he nonetheless required that the warrantless search be based 
upon probable cause.144 
In Wyoming v. Houghton, too, Justice Scalia rooted his analysis 
in probable cause.145 There, David Young and his girlfriend, San-
dra Houghton, were stopped by Wyoming Highway Patrol for a 
traffic violation.146 During the stop, the officer noticed a hypoder-
mic syringe in Mr. Young’s shirt pocket.147 He asked Mr. Young 
why he had the syringe, and Mr. Young replied candidly that he 
used it to take drugs.148 The officer then searched the vehicle, and 
found Ms. Houghton’s purse which contained methamphetamine 
and drug paraphernalia.149 
The trial court denied Ms. Houghton’s motion to suppress, hold-
ing that the officer had probable cause to search the car, and there-
fore could search all closed containers in the vehicle.150 The Wyo-
ming Supreme Court reversed, holding that probable cause did not 
extend to the personal effects of a passenger who was not suspected 
 
 141. Id. In 2001, Professor Seamon noted that this criticism had apparently resonated, 
as at that time the majority’s opinion in Acevedo was the last time the warrant preference 
school appeared in a majority opinion. Seamon, supra note 81, at 1027. He posited that “the 
broad version of the presumption seems to have died from embarrassment.” Id. In more 
recent years, though, this prediction has not borne out. Since 2001, the Court has continued 
to fluctuate between the warrant preference school and the reasonableness school, and has 
adopted the warrant preference school in various cases. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. 
Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419–20 (2015); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 563 (2004). 
 142. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583–84 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 143. See id. at 585. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300–01 (1999).  
 146. Id. at 297–98. 
 147. Id. at 298. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 299. 
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of criminal activity.151 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, re-
versed the decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court, holding that 
the search did not violate Ms. Houghton’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.152 He focused on the fact that officers had probable cause to 
believe the car contained drugs.153 He cited Carroll v. United States 
and United States v. Ross, which discussed historical legislation 
that let customs officials search ships if they had probable cause.154 
Because merchandise was shipped in containers, the authority to 
search with probable cause must have included the authority to 
search closed containers; officers could not have needed a separate 
warrant for each shipping container.155 Thus, he held that neither 
precedent nor historical evidence recognized a distinction between 
closed containers based on who owned them.156 He laid down a 
bright-line rule that where there is probable cause to search a car, 
it is reasonable for officers to search all closed containers in the 
car—including the passenger’s personal possessions.157 
In Arizona v. Gant, Justice Scalia again used the notion of prob-
able cause in the second clause to inform his interpretation of “rea-
sonableness” in the first.158 In that case, Rodney Gant was arrested 
for driving with a suspended license.159 After he was handcuffed 
and placed in the backseat of a police patrol car, two officers 
searched his vehicle.160 They found a gun and a bag of cocaine.161 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 302. 
 153. Id. at 300. 
 154. Id. at 300–01 (first citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and then 
citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 n.26 (1982)). 
 155. Id. at 301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26). 
 156. Id. at 302. 
 157. Id. Justice Scalia then went on to say that even if the historical evidence was un-
persuasive, a balancing of interests also weighed in favor of allowing the search. Id. at 303. 
He noted that passengers in cars on public roads have a reduced expectation of privacy, 
whereas the government interest in being able to search a vehicle—which could easily leave 
the scene if officers were required to wait for a warrant—was substantial. Id. at 303–04. He 
noted that a criminal could easily hide contraband in his passenger’s belongings—even with-
out the passenger’s knowledge or permission—to evade a potential search. Id. at 304–05. 
He stated that the gray area of this rule would invite a flood of litigation about various 
factors showing whether an item was owned by the driver or a passenger. Id. at 305–06. He 
wrote that this practical reality must be accounted for in the balancing analysis. Id. at 306. 
 158. 556 U.S. 332, 351–54 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 336 (majority opinion). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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Mr. Gant moved to suppress the items, arguing that the warrant-
less search violated the Fourth Amendment.162 The majority 
adopted the warrant preference school, citing the statement in 
Katz that the warrant requirement is “subject only to a few specif-
ically established and well-delineated exceptions.”163 One of those 
exceptions, it noted, was a search incident to a lawful arrest, which 
was espoused in Chimel v. California.164  
In 1969, in Chimel, the Court had held that a search incident to 
arrest extends not only to the arrestee’s person, but also to the 
“grabbable space” around him.165 In 1981, in New York v. Belton, 
the Court applied this exception to people arrested while driving.166 
There, the Court held that the Chimel exception extended to the 
interior of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, even if the 
occupant was no longer in reaching distance of it.167  
In Gant, the Court rejected this broad reading of Belton, and 
held that the Chimel rationale only applies where the arrestee is 
“unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment at the time of the search.”168 The majority stated, alter-
natively, that a search of the interior of the vehicle could be justi-
fied if it was “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime 
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”169 In this case, the majority 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 338 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)). 
 164. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
 165. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 166. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
 167. Id. Much of the rationale in Belton was regarding the necessity of clear rules in the 
Fourth Amendment context. Id. at 458. The Court cited Professor LaFave’s article, arguing 
that Fourth Amendment protection is futile unless law enforcement is bound by a set of 
clear rules. Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized 
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142). The Court stated: “When 
a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situ-
ation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a police-
man know the scope of his authority.” Id. at 459–60. The dissent called the majority’s bright-
line “arbitrary,” and argued that the mere fact that a rule is supposedly more efficient for 
law enforcement “can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 469 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued, moreover, that the majority’s rule abandoned 
the primary justifications from Chimel because it applied whether or not the occupant was, 
in fact, still in reaching distance of the interior of the car. Id. at 470. 
 168. 556 U.S. at 343. The Gant opinion was 5–4; Justice Scalia’s concurring vote was 
necessary to reach a majority. 
 169. Id. (quoting Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring)). Justice Scalia had previously espoused this view in his concurrence in Thorton, 541 
U.S. at 632. 
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stated that the defendant was arrested for a traffic violation, and 
therefore there was no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle 
would contain evidence of that crime.170 Thus, because Mr. Gant 
was secured in the backseat of a police vehicle, and there was no 
reason to believe his car would contain evidence of the crime of ar-
rest, the majority held the search was unreasonable.171 
Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that the Court should “simply 
abandon the Belton–Thorton charade of officer safety and overrule 
those cases.”172 Justice Scalia was needed to make up a majority, 
and characterized the majority concession to probable cause as an 
artificial narrowing of the majority opinion. He agreed only with 
the majority’s second rationale: that officers could search a vehicle 
incident to arrest if they had probable cause to believe that evi-
dence of the crime of arrest would be found.173 He stated that such 
a search was “ipso facto ‘reasonable.’”174 This statement is con-
sistent with the idea that the word “reasonable” contains within it 
a presumption of probable cause.175 Justice Scalia used this analy-
sis to cut through the uncertainties produced by the majority’s 
holding, which allowed “reasonableness” to be proven in multiple 
ways.176 The rule he professed was simple: if officers had probable 
cause that evidence would be found in the vehicle, they could 
search it. If not, they could not. 
In Whren v. United States, Justice Scalia once again rooted his 
analysis in probable cause.177 There, plainclothes officers were pa-
trolling a “high drug area” of Washington, D.C. in an unmarked 
car.178 They noticed a truck with temporary license plates and 
“youthful occupants” stop at an intersection for an “unusually long 
time.”179 The officers did a U-turn to follow the truck.180 The truck 
turned right without signaling and took off at an “unreasonable” 
 
 170. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
 171. Id. at 344. 
 172. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. at 343 (majority opinion). 
 177. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996). 
 178. Id. at 808. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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speed.181 The officers followed, eventually pulled up next to it, and 
directed the driver to pull over.182 The officer then noticed two large 
plastic bags he believed to contain crack cocaine in Michael 
Whren’s—the passenger’s—hands.183 Mr. Whren and the driver—
James Brown—were both indicted on various drug charges.184 
Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown moved to suppress the drugs, arguing 
that the alleged purpose for the stop—giving the driver a warning 
about traffic violations—was pretextual.185 They pointed out that 
it was not common for vice detectives to worry about traffic viola-
tions.186 Though they acknowledged that the officers had probable 
cause to believe they had committed a civil traffic violation, they 
argued that “‘in the unique context of civil traffic regulations’ prob-
able cause is not enough.”187 They argued that because the civil 
traffic code was so vast, officers will almost always have reason to 
stop someone for some technical violation.188 This created an envi-
ronment, they argued, where police could choose whom to stop 
based on discriminatory factors—such as race—as both Mr. Whren 
and Mr. Brown were African-American.189 
Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown proposed a balancing analysis, argu-
ing that the Court should determine “whether the officer’s conduct 
deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasona-
ble officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop 
for the reasons given.”190 They asserted that the Court should en-
gage in a balancing analysis, and weigh the governmental and in-
dividual interests.191 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, refused to adopt the bal-
ancing analysis.192 While he acknowledged that various Fourth 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 808–09. 
 184. Id. at 809. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Brief for Petitioners at 5–7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). 
 187. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 814. 
 191. Id. at 816. 
 192. Id. at 817. He also stated that while the petitioners’ proposed standard claimed to 
be objective by not looking at the officer’s subjective motivations, it was nonetheless a sub-
jective standard. Id. at 813–14. 
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Amendment cases did rely on balancing analyses, he stated that if 
the search or seizure was based upon probable cause, the balance 
clearly weighed in favor of the government.193 He noted that the 
searches in the cases petitioners cited all took place without prob-
able cause, and thus balancing had been necessary.194 The only ex-
ceptions to this rule, he said, were “extraordinary” searches or sei-
zures—such as seizures by means of deadly force—where the Court 
should balance interests even though there had been probable 
cause.195 But for the ordinary case, Scalia said, the rule was that 
probable cause justifies a search and seizure.196 Thus, because here 
the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had vio-
lated a traffic code, the search and seizure was reasonable.197 In-
stead of determining whether an officer’s action was “reasonable” 
based on a variety of factors, Scalia again rooted his analysis in the 
bright-line rule of probable cause. 
C.  Originalism and Textualism 
Justice Scalia also used originalism and textualism to limit ju-
dicial discretion. This framework aided him in formulating bright-
line rules. He argued that this method made it easier for him to 
develop general rules, because without grounding one’s reasoning 
within a textualist or originalist framework, rules could sound ee-
rily like legislation.198 He thought that nonoriginalism left judges 
too much discretion to impose their own politics and morals into 
their decisions.199 In this context he was a true textualist, turning 
 
 193. Id. at 817 (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since 
it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. 
With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in 
doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.”). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 818. 
 196. Id. at 819. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1184–85. 
 199. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 854–56. Scalia’s originalist and textualist 
philosophy was not without its critics. Professors Lawrence Tribe and Ronald Dworkin have 
argued that they, not Scalia, are the genuine originalists and textualists. David M. Zlotnick, 
Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional 
Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1406 (1999). Professors Calabresi and Lawson, further, 
have examined to what extent the Constitution itself prescribes rules over standards. See 
Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 489–97. They determined that there are many places 
where the Constitution itself prescribes standards—such as “due process,” “speedy” trials, 
“impartial” juries, bails that are not “excessive.” Id. at 497. In many cases, though—such as 
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to the words of the Fourth Amendment itself. In these cases, he 
was not determining whether a search or seizure was “reasonable,” 
but whether a search or seizure had even occurred in the first 
place. 
For example in California v. Hodari D., Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, replaced the vague standard from United States 
v. Mendenhall with a bright-line rule.200 In that case, a group of 
young men in Oakland, California, saw officers patrolling the area, 
panicked, and ran.201 The officers, suspicious, chased the men.202 
While running, one of the men—Hodari D.—tossed away a small 
item.203 One of the officers subsequently tackled Hodari and hand-
cuffed him.204 Hodari moved to suppress the item, which was dis-
covered to be cocaine, on the basis that he had been “seized” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment while the officer was chas-
ing him.205 Hodari argued that by chasing him, the officer had en-
gaged in a “show of authority.”206 He cited the plurality in Menden-
hall to argue that a seizure occurs where “a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”207 
Justice Scalia found that the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment did not support Hodari’s argument.208 “Seizure,” Scalia said, 
meant some application of physical force; a mere “show of author-
ity” was not sufficient.209 The Mendenhall test was a necessary, but 
not sufficient, factor for a seizure to have occurred.210 Justice Scalia 
held that a “seizure” required either physical force, or, not only a 
show of authority but submission to that authority.211 Merely being 
 
the nondelegation doctrine—they argue that Scalia ignored original meaning, and opted 
instead to create bright-line rules. Id. at 489–90. Thus, they argue that Scalia’s preference 
for rules often thwarts other considerations such as original meaning. Id. at 495. 
 200. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); Zlotnick, supra note 199, at 1390–91 (noting that 
Scalia tends to define words as narrowly as possible, and calling Hodari D. an example of 
“constitutional law by Webster’s”). 
 201. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622–23. 
 202. Id. at 623. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 625–26 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). 
 207. Id. at 627–28 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
 208. Id. at 626. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 628. 
 211. Id. at 626. 
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chased by the police and not complying did not constitute a seizure 
because there was no submission.212 
Justice Scalia discussed the definition of “seizure” two years 
prior in his essay The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.213 He criti-
cized the Mendenhall test as it was applied in Michigan v. Ches-
ternut.214 There, the majority applied the Mendenhall test and 
found that a “seizure” had occurred when “a person in the defend-
ant’s position would not have felt that he was free to disregard the 
police and go about his business.”215 Justice Scalia called this “a 
rule of sorts,” but found it was not as precise as it should be.216 He 
instead joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, stating that there 
had been no “seizure” until there was a “restraining effect.”217 
Scalia noted that his textualist methodology made it easier for him 
than for other judges to develop general rules.218 
Similarly, in Minnesota v. Carter, Justice Scalia turned to the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment.219 In that case, a police officer 
looked in an apartment window through a gap in the closed blinds 
and saw two men bagging cocaine.220 The Court held that one of 
the men, Mr. Carter, did not have standing to contest the alleged 
search.221 Mr. Carter did not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the plurality contended, because he was merely at the apart-
ment to engage in a short-term business transaction.222 There was 
no suggestion, the plurality stated, that Mr. Carter had a previous 
relationship with the person who lived in the apartment, or any-
thing akin to the relationship of an overnight guest at his host’s 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1184. 
 214. Id. (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988)). 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 218. Id. Professor David Strauss, though, argued that Scalia’s interpretation of the word 
“seizure” is not based on its plain meaning. Strauss, supra note 27, at 1005. Strauss noted 
that in context, a “seizure” applies to police action, and there are plenty of circumstances in 
which an officer has “seized” someone though he has not physically grabbed or taken pos-
session of him. Id. For example, when an officer points a weapon at a person and orders him 
to stop. Id. Professor Strauss argued that instead of deriving the rule from the text, Scalia 
first decided he would like to use a rule, not a standard, and second crafted a rule that could 
then be made compatible with the meaning of “seizure.” Id. at 1005. 
 219. 525 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 220. Id. at 85 (majority opinion). 
 221. Id. at 90. 
 222. Id. at 91. 
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apartment.223 While an overnight visitor might have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, someone who visited an apartment only to 
participate in a brief business transaction did not.224 
Justice Scalia concurred, rooting his analysis in the meaning of 
the word “their” in the Fourth Amendment.225 He analyzed found-
ing-era materials to determine that the phrase “right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”226 meant 
that each person had a right to be free in “his own person, house, 
papers, and effects.”227 He concurred with the majority that be-
cause Mr. Carter was not in his house, or even any house that he 
could have considered a temporary residence, the Fourth Amend-
ment was not violated.228 Thus, Justice Scalia used textualism to 
formulate a bright-line rule. 
D.  Keeping Easy Cases Easy: The Trespass Test and Its 
Applicability in the Digital Age 
Probably the most significant contribution Justice Scalia made 
to future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was reintroducing the 
trespass standard.229 Some argue that this standard could provide 
a more predictable way to analyze searches in the digital age.230 
Justice Scalia favored the trespass test over the test from Katz v. 
United States, which analyzed expectations of privacy.231 The Katz 
test originated in Justice Harlan’s 1967 concurrence in Katz.232 It 
established a two-fold requirement: first, that one have a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy; and second, that society recognizes this 
 
 223. Id. at 90–91 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., concurring). He rejected the majority’s reliance on the Katz 
test to determine if a search had occurred. Id. at 91–92. 
 226. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 227. Carter, 525 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 228. Id. at 97 (noting that it is implausible to call an apartment someone uses only to 
package cocaine his “temporary residence”). 
 229. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 232. 
 230. See infra notes 308–13 and accompanying text. 
 231. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 232. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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expectation as reasonable.233 For years, the Katz test was consid-
ered the only standard.234 
Not surprisingly, Scalia loathed the Katz test. It allowed for ju-
dicial activism to an extreme. Even before reviving the alternative 
trespass test to use in its stead,235 he repeatedly questioned Katz’s 
validity. For example, in 1987 in O’Connor v. Ortega, the majority 
opinion used Katz to hold that searches and seizures by govern-
ment employers of the offices of their employees should be ana-
lyzed on a case-by-case basis.236 Scalia—then in only his second 
term on the Court—concurred, writing that the majority’s stand-
ard was “so devoid of content that it produces rather than elimi-
nates uncertainty in this field.”237 
In 1998, Justice Scalia attacked Katz even more explicitly in 
Minnesota v. Carter.238 The majority rooted its analysis in Katz: it 
stated that one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in an apartment which one has entered only to engage in a short-
term business transaction—in this case, bagging cocaine.239 Justice 
Scalia concurred, criticizing the plurality for using the Katz test, 
which he called not only “fuzzy” but also “self-indulgent.”240 He ar-
gued that the second prong of the Katz test—whether society rec-
ognizes an expectation as “reasonable”—bore an “uncanny resem-
blance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers 
reasonable.”241 He saw Katz as a means for judges to impose their 
 
 233. See id. at 361. 
 234. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 233 (noting that until 2012, Katz was the primary 
test); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
316 (2012) (noting that from the 1960s until 2012, the Katz test governed). 
 235. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07. Justice Scalia did, however, occasionally employ the 
Katz test, most notably in Kyllo v. United States and his special needs cases. See infra notes 
246–57 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A. 
 236. 480 U.S. 709, 717–18 (1987) (“Given the great variety of work environments in the 
public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 237. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 238. 525 U.S. 83, 97–98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra notes 219–28 and 
accompanying text. 
 239. Carter, 525 U.S. at 86, 90–91. 
 240. Id. at 91, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 241. Id. at 97. 
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own values and policy views onto the Fourth Amendment, and ar-
gued that such decisions should be more properly left to the legis-
lature.242 
In other instances, however, Scalia did allow the Court to deter-
mine what was “reasonable,” because the determination was based 
on the text of the Fourth Amendment. Analyzing whether a war-
rantless search is “unreasonable”—in contrast to whether one has 
a “reasonable expectation of privacy”—is based on the text of the 
Fourth Amendment itself.243 Justice Scalia noted that the Katz test 
might have some utility in determining whether a search was “un-
reasonable.”244 But he thought that employing a “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy” analysis to determine whether a search had even 
occurred, in contrast, had no justification in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.245  
When Justice Scalia was tasked to write the majority opinion of 
the Court, he would occasionally give lip-service to the Katz test. 
For example, in Kyllo v. United States, federal agents became sus-
picious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his triplex and 
used a thermal imager to scan the building from the outside to de-
tect whether it contained high-intensity lamps typically used to 
grow marijuana.246 The scan showed that parts of Mr. Kyllo’s home 
were substantially warmer than the neighboring apartments, and 
based on that information—as well as tips from informants and 
utility bills—the officers applied for and were granted a warrant to 
search his home.247 The search revealed more than one hundred 
marijuana plants and Mr. Kyllo was charged with manufacturing 
marijuana.248 
 
 242. Id. at 97–99. 
 243. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra section I.B; see also Calabresi & Lawson, supra 
note 4, at 497 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” searches 
and seizures is an example of when the Constitution prescribes using a standard and not a 
rule); Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1181–82 (expounding on why a “reasonable 
search” is a question of law, yet “reasonable care” in a torts case is a question of fact). 
 244. Carter, 525 U.S. at 86, 91–92 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” analysis “is often relevant to whether a search or seizure covered by 
the Fourth Amendment is ‘unreasonable’”). 
 245. Id. at 91, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 246. 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). Scalia also used Katz in special needs cases. See infra 
section II.A. 
 247. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. 
 248. Id. 
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used the Katz test de-
spite his distaste for it.249 He wrote that while in other areas Katz 
was difficult to apply, in the home—the “prototypical” area of pro-
tected privacy—it was clear what baseline expectation of privacy 
was reasonable.250 Here, applying Katz was consistent with the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment, which specifically protects 
“houses.”251 Justice Scalia employed Katz to protect the amount of 
privacy people enjoyed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.252 He held that when the government uses technology not 
in general public use to glean information about the home that 
would formerly have been unknowable without physically entering 
the home, “the surveillance is a ‘search.’”253 
Though in Kyllo he used Katz, Scalia formulated a bright-line 
rule, not a “fuzzy standard.”254 The line he chose was at the en-
trance to the home.255 “That line,” he wrote, “must not only be firm 
but also bright.”256 Despite the fact that Justice Scalia intended to 
implement a bright-line rule, Justice Stevens commented on the 
use of technology not in general public use and argued that it was 
not as clear as Scalia had intended. Justice Stevens wrote that “the 
contours of the new rule are uncertain because its protection ap-
parently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is ‘in general 
public use.’”257 
In United States v. Jones in 2012, Justice Scalia renewed his at-
tack on Katz, this time reviving an alternative test to use in its 
stead.258 The common-law trespass test, which Scalia revived, had 
dominated Fourth Amendment law until the second half of the 
 
 249. See id. at 32–33. Justice Scalia cited his concurrence in Carter and acknowledged 
that the Katz test had “often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredict-
able.” Id. at 34 (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 97). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. 
 252. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see Rosenthal, supra note 56, at 117 (describing Kyllo as 
originalist because it insisted on preserving original degree of privacy). Here, Justice Scalia 
was employing the second part of his two-step methodology: because thermal imaging did 
not exist in 1791, there was no clear practice to look to. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, he proceeded to the second step, and determined 
“traditional standards of reasonableness.” See id. 
 253. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 254. See id.; see also Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (criticizing Katz for being a “fuzzy standard”). 
 255. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). 
 258. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012). 
BLOOM 553 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2021  9:09 AM 
2021] RULES AND STANDARDS  743 
 
20th century.259 In Jones, the FBI suspected nightclub owner An-
toine Jones of drug trafficking.260 The government obtained a war-
rant to install a GPS tracking device on Mr. Jones’s wife’s Jeep.261 
The warrant was valid in the District of Columbia for ten days.262 
On the eleventh day—and in Maryland, not D.C.—agents physi-
cally installed a GPS tracker on the bottom of the Jeep while it sat 
in a public parking lot.263 The government proceeded to track the 
Jeep for the next twenty-eight days.264 The government then used 
the location information to indict Mr. Jones on various drug distri-
bution charges.265 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the govern-
ment “search[ed]” Mr. Jones’s vehicle when it physically installed 
the GPS tracker.266 The government invoked Katz and argued that 
Mr. Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the under-
side of the Jeep.267 Justice Scalia rejected this argument, stating 
that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the 
Katz formulation.”268 Instead of using Katz, Scalia revived the com-
mon-law trespass test.269 This test dictated that when “the Govern-
ment obtains information by physically intruding on a constitu-
tionally protected area . . . a search has undoubtedly occurred.”270 
As in Kyllo, Scalia was concerned about preserving the degree of 
 
 259. Id. at 405. 
 260. Id. at 402. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 402–03. 
 263. Id. at 403. The government conceded that the warrant had not been complied with. 
Id. at 403 n.1. 
 264. Id. at 403. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 404. 
 267. Id. at 406. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 405–07. Note, though, that despite relying on the common-law notion of “tres-
pass,” under this test the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all common-law tres-
passes. See id. at 411 n.8. In Jones, Justice Scalia replied to the government’s concern that 
intrusion onto an open field in Oliver v. United States had been a “trespass” and yet the 
Court had held it was not a “search.”  Id. at 410–11 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 176–77, 183 (1984)). Justice Scalia noted that the Court’s theory was “not that the 
Fourth Amendment is concerned with ‘any technical trespass that led to the gathering of 
evidence.’” Id. at 411 n.8 (quoting concurring opinion). Rather, he stated that the Fourth 
Amendment only protects against trespasses of those areas enumerated in the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. An open field is not a person, house, paper, or effect, and thus a trespass 
onto an open field is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 411. 
 270. Id. at 406 n.3. 
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privacy citizens enjoyed at the time the Fourth Amendment was 
enacted.271 
He did not, however, go as far as to eliminate Katz.272 He stated 
that it still had some utility as a secondary test.273 He added that 
the Katz test had been “added to, not substituted for, the common-
law trespassory test.”274 This may be because he was writing the 
majority opinion.275 Professor Timothy MacDonnell has called this 
analysis the “trespass plus” test: first, determine whether the gov-
ernment has trespassed on some constitutionally protected space; 
if not, second, determine whether a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy has been violated.276 
In Jones, Justice Scalia also rejected the so-called “mosaic the-
ory” used by the lower court and seemingly endorsed by the con-
currences.277 The mosaic theory, as defined by Professor Orin Kerr, 
is the idea that instead of analyzing the sequential steps of govern-
ment activity, courts should look at the aggregate government ac-
tion to determine whether a “search” has occurred.278  
 
 271. Id. at 406 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
 272. He was writing the majority opinion, so his disdain for Katz was not as prevalent 
as in his concurrence in Carter. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 273. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“For unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the 
exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test.”). 
 274. Id. at 409. 
 275. Scholars have questioned whether Scalia’s ultimate goal was to eliminate the Katz 
test, leaving only the trespass analysis. See, e.g., Stras et al., supra note 5, at 746. Professor 
Kerr noted that if the Katz test is retained, then Scalia’s revival of the trespass test does 
not make an obvious impact. See id. It alters the analytical steps but may not change how 
cases come out. See id. 
 276. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 246; Timothy C. MacDonnell, Florida v. Jardines: 
The Wolf at the Castle Door, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 79 (2013). 
 277. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412 (describing the “vexing problems” posed by the approach 
of the concurrences); id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that whether a search 
has occurred depends in part on “whether people reasonably expect that their movements 
will be recorded and aggregated”); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that long-
term GPS monitoring is a search, even if short-term is not); United States v. Maynard, 615 
F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that prolonged surveillance may constitute a 
search because “th[e] whole reveals far more than the individual movements it comprises”), 
aff’d sub nom. Jones, 565 U.S. 400; see also Kerr, supra note 234, at 313 (citing Orin Kerr, 
D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a 
Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volok 
h.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-mo 
nitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search [https://perma.cc/D2BQ-6AAM] (coining the term 
“mosaic theory”)). 
 278. Kerr, supra note 234, at 313. 
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Because Justice Scalia decided Jones using the trespass test, he 
did not engage with the mosaic theory.279 The trespass test is 
rooted in what Professor Kerr called the traditional “sequential ap-
proach,” wherein courts analyze government action step-by-step to 
determine when a “search” occurs.280 In Jones, a search occurred 
the moment the officer physically installed the GPS tracker on An-
toine Jones’s vehicle.281 Justice Scalia declined to look at the total-
ity of the government’s action and instead focused on a single snap-
shot.282 Thus, the trespass test allowed Scalia to draw a bright-line 
rule instead of balancing the totality of the government’s action.283 
He was critical of the mosaic test because there was no bright-line 
showing when a search became unconstitutional. 
Justice Scalia employed the revived trespass test again the next 
term in Florida v. Jardines.284 There, two detectives approached 
the home of Joelis Jardines, who was suspected of growing mariju-
ana.285 One of the detectives brought his drug-sniffing dog.286 When 
the detectives and the dog walked onto the porch, the dog signaled 
to the presence of drugs inside the house.287 At trial, Mr. Jardines 
argued that the dog sniff was an unreasonable search.288 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that because the 
government had physically intruded onto the curtilage of Mr. 
Jardines’s home, a search had clearly occurred.289 Thus, when the 
 
 279. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411–12. 
 280. Kerr, supra note 234, at 315–16. Professor Kerr cited Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Arizona v. Hicks as an example of the sequential approach; there, the Court looked at dis-
tinct steps: the officer saw the expensive stereo equipment, he moved it, then he recorded 
the serial number. Id. at 316. 
 281. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 282. See id. at 412. 
 283. Not only is there a line-drawing problem regarding how prolonged surveillance 
would need to be to constitute a search, but Professor Kerr has detailed the numerous other 
uncertainties of the mosaic theory: the test that should be used to determine when a mosaic 
has been created, what surveillance methods are applicable, how to determine whether a 
mosaic search is reasonable, and what remedies apply to mosaic searches. Kerr, supra note 
234, at 329. 
 284. 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013). Note, though, that in Jardines, Justice Scalia did not explic-
itly use the term “trespass” anywhere in the opinion. See generally id. 
 285. Id. at 3. 
 286. Id. at 3–4. 
 287. Id. at 4–5. 
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. at 5–6 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)). As he did in 
Kyllo, Scalia expounded on the importance of the home. Id. at 6. He noted that the right to 
be free from the government in one’s home was at the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment 
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government “physically intrud[es]” on an area protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, Scalia said there was no need to even consider 
Katz.290 He noted that one feature of the property analysis was that 
it “keeps easy cases easy.”291 Either the government has physically 
intruded or it has not.292 This analysis eliminates the need to en-
gage in the wishy-washy analysis from Katz.293 
Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the trespass test and disdain for 
the fluffy Katz standard has had a lasting impact on the Court 
since his departure. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Carpenter v. 
United States evinces many of the same concerns, and contem-
plates how Scalia’s reasoning could be applied in the digital age.294 
In Carpenter, the Court examined whether the warrantless 
search and seizure of location information from one’s cell phone vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment.295 The majority used the rationale 
from Katz to determine that the Fourth Amendment had been vio-
lated.296 It held that even though individuals share their records 
with a third party—the cell phone company—they do not forfeit 
their reasonable expectations of privacy in the records.297 The ma-
jority thus refused to apply the “third-party doctrine”—a doctrine 
based on the Katz rationale where individuals lose their reasonable 
expectations of privacy in information when they share it with a 
third party.298 
 
and called the home “first among equals.” Id. Because the curtilage is both spatially and 
psychologically linked to the home, he deemed it part of the home itself. Id. at 6–7. 
 290. Id. at 11. 
 291. Id. However, Jardines is one of the few cases where Justice Scalia acknowledged 
the need to look at an officer’s subjective intent. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 216. Sub-
jective intent was relevant to the issue of whether the officers had committed a trespass. Id. 
at 216–17. He noted that visitors are generally implicitly licensed to approach a home on 
the front walkway, knock, and wait for someone to come to the door—as commonly done by 
girl scouts or trick-or-treaters. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8. But here, Scalia noted, the officer’s 
conduct indicated that their subjective intent was not to enter the curtilage for some cus-
tomary reason, but rather, to conduct a search. Id. at 10. 
 292. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5. 
 293. See id. 
 294. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261–62 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Scalia himself, though, 
did not argue that the trespass test had an application to digital searches. In Jones, Scalia 
wrote that searches “involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without tres-
pass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 411. 
 295. 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (majority opinion). 
 296. Id. at 2217. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 2216–17. The third-party doctrine is derived from United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 
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Justice Gorsuch dissented. Not only did he argue that Katz was 
misguided, but he expressed concern that the majority’s reasoning 
required courts to perform not one, but two “amorphous balancing 
tests.”299 He argued that the majority required courts to first con-
duct the Katz analysis, then further balance the privacy interests 
to determine whether to apply the third-party doctrine.300 He ar-
gued that the majority opinion did not offer a workable test and 
was susceptible to the same fuzziness as Katz: “At what point does 
access to electronic data amount to ‘arbitrary’ authority? When 
does police surveillance become ‘too permeating’? And what sort of 
‘obstacles’ should judges ‘place’ in law enforcement’s path when it 
does?”301 In addition, Justice Gorsuch’s rationale was reminiscent 
of Justice Scalia’s abhorrence for judicial activism. He noted that 
judges should decide based on “democratically legitimate sources 
of law” and not “their own biases or personal policy preferences.”302 
Instead, Justice Gorsuch advocated for using the trespass test.303 
He noted that in the digital age, the third-party doctrine—a legacy 
of Katz—is no longer tenable because we now store so much of our 
private information digitally on servers held by third parties.304 He 
argued that digital data is an “effect[]” under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and its owner has a legal interest in it.305 That legal interest, 
he argued, “might even rise to the level of a property right.”306 Be-
cause the issue had not been briefed or argued before the lower 
 
(describing the third-party doctrine). 
 299. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 2266. 
 302. Id. at 2268 (quoting Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 
J.L. & POL. 123, 127 (2011)). 
 303. Id. at 2267–68 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)). 
 304. Id. at 2262, 2266. 
 305. Id. at 2269. 
 306. Id. at 2272. Justice Gorsuch noted that one issue that would need to be developed 
is what body of property law federal courts should apply. Id. at 2268. He posited that the 
answer might be current positive law, the common law at 1791, or some combination of the 
two. Id. Justices Thomas and Alito have also raised this concern. In Byrd v. United States, 
Justice Thomas concurred, and asked “what body of law determines whether that property 
interest is present—modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something else?” 138 S. 
Ct. 1518, 1531 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Alito raised this concern in his Jones 
concurrence, positing that under the property rationale, Fourth Amendment protections 
could differ from state to state. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 425–26 (2012) (Alito, 
J., concurring). In Jones, the Jeep belonged to Mr. Jones’s wife, and therefore his property 
interest in it might depend on whether the state where the search took place recognized 
community property between spouses. Id. 
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courts, Justice Gorsuch did not decide whether the government 
committed a trespass when it seized Mr. Carpenter’s cell site loca-
tion information, but he noted that it would have been Mr. Carpen-
ter’s most promising argument that his Fourth Amendment rights 
had been violated.307 
Scholars differ on the applicability of the trespass analysis to 
digital searches.308 Justice Scalia himself never advocated for its 
use for searches of digital data where there was no physical tres-
pass; he said the Katz test was still applicable in those instances.309 
Indeed, some scholars argue that under a narrow reading of the 
trespass test from Jones, it would not apply to searches of data 
without physical trespass.310 Others, though, argue that the prop-
erty analysis is worthy of serious consideration and could offer 
broader and more secure protections than Katz in the digital age.311 
As we look to the future, we should note that the majority of the 
current Supreme Court Justices have indicated a willingness to 
 
 307. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 308. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.1(e) (5th ed. 2019) (discussing tres-
pass test in digital age and citing sources). 
 309. In Jones, Scalia wrote that searches “involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 411. 
 310. E.g., Andrew G. Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
547, 580–81 (2017). Professor Kerr has argued that the proper way to deal with digital 
searches is to use the standard from the Carpenter majority: courts should look at the type 
of data implicated and whether the disclosure was voluntary. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing 
Carpenter: The Digital Fourth Amendment 20 (USC Legal Studies Paper No. 18-29, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3.papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257 [https://perma.cc/DD5U-GW 
XU]. In his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito noted that in recent years courts had ana-
lyzed cases about unwanted electronic contact under a tort theory of trespass, holding that 
the transmission of electrons is a sufficient physical touching. 565 U.S. at 426 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (citing cases). Yet Justice Alito questioned whether that same analysis could 
also apply to Fourth Amendment cases. Id. at 426–27. 
 311. E.g., Melody J. Brannon, Carpenter v. United States: Building a Property-Based 
Fourth Amendment Approach for Digital Data, CRIM. JUST. MAG. (Winter 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazi 
ne/2019/winter/carpenter-v-united-states [https://perma.cc/DRR7-CVX5]; Megan Blass, 
Note, The New Data Marketplace: Protecting Personal Data, Electronic Communications, 
and Individual Privacy in the Age of Mass Surveillance Through a Return to a Property-
Based Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577, 588 (2015) (“Vest-
ing property rights in personal data and electronic communications will provide the Court 
with a tangible foundation for applying its trespass theory.”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 
308, § 2.1(e) n.145 (citing sources). 
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use the trespass test.312 Only Justices Alito and Breyer have been 
unwilling to use it.313 
II.  STANDARDS: “SLOSHING THROUGH THE FACTBOUND MORASS 
OF ‘REASONABLENESS’”314 
Despite his avowed support of bright-line rules and disdain for 
totality-of-the-circumstances tests involving balancing,315 Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that “for my sins, I will probably write some 
opinions that use them.”316 He wrote a number of opinions which 
departed from his general preference for rules, and instead applied 
standards.317 But even though he acknowledged this inconsistency, 
he specifically declined to address what he called the “hardest 
question”: when is a standard avoidable and when is it not?318 
 
 312. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (praising the trespass 
test); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion); Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion). Further, 
Justice—then Judge—Kavanaugh was on the D.C. Circuit when it heard Jones. Judge Ka-
vanaugh dissented from a denial of a rehearing en banc, arguing that the court should have 
analyzed the case using the trespass rationale. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–
771 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), denying reh’g en banc to United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Jones, 565 U.S. 400. He did not say 
definitively whether he thought the trespass rationale would have applied in that case, but 
asserted that it should have been briefed and argued. Id. at 771. We do not know what 
Justice Barrett’s position is as she did not have any cases involving this issue when she was 
a judge on the Seventh Circuit. However, as a former clerk for Justice Scalia, one can predict 
she would be a proponent of the trespass doctrine. 
 313. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 16 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 314. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). 
 315. Professor Rachel Barkow, a former Scalia clerk, joked that if you wanted to make 
Scalia gasp, mention a totality-of-the-circumstances test. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 770. 
In one of his administrative law dissents, Justice Scalia jeeringly referred to such tests as 
“th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.” See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 316. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1187. 
 317. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 495 (examining cases in which Scalia de-
viated from his stated preference for rules and referring to him as something of a “faint-
hearted rule-ist”). In various cases, Justice Scalia balanced the rights of individuals versus 
the needs of the government based on what would make good policy, despite, on other occa-
sions, disavowing the “good-policy-is-constitutional-law school of jurisprudence.” Minnesota 
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Calabresi & Lawson, su-
pra note 4, at 494–95 (examining cases where Scalia used standards rather than rules). 
 318. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1187. 
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This Part will attempt to tackle that question. In substantive 
Fourth Amendment decisions and in cases involving criminal de-
fendants, Scalia usually applied rules.319 But in special needs cases 
that were largely civil in nature, as well as in cases regarding the 
correct remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, Scalia strayed 
and applied a standard.320 
Section A of this Part outlines Justice Scalia’s special needs 
cases, many of which use balancing tests.321 Section B examines 
cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations,322 and 
Section C discusses the implications of choosing to apply a rule ra-
ther than a standard.323 
A.  Special Needs 
One exception to the warrant requirement is the “special needs” 
search. The special needs doctrine grew out of the “administrative 
search[]” framework, which originated in the 1960s.324 The term 
“special needs” was first used by Justice Blackmun in 1985 in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. to refer to cases which required a lower standard 
of justification than probable cause.325 Because a warrant and 
probable cause are not required in these cases, reasonableness is 
determined by balancing governmental and private interests.326 
The special needs doctrine is applicable in “exceptional circum-
stances” where there is a special need distinct from ordinary law 
enforcement.327 The term “special needs” is now a catch-all for 
many types of searches that require less than probable cause, such 
 
 319. See supra Part I (substantive Fourth Amendment); infra notes 353–71 and accom-
panying text (criminal defendants). 
 320. See infra sections II.A, II.B. 
 321. See infra section II.A. 
 322. See infra section II.B. 
 323. See infra section II.C. 
 324. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967); see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 
541, 543–44 (1967). For a description of the evolution of the special needs exception, see Eve 
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 245, 260, 276 
(2011). 
 325. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001) (citing New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. This distinction is not always clear or easy to apply. See Barry Friedman & Cyn-
thia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 281, 295 (2016) (describing inconsistencies in special needs cases regarding 
“ordinary crime control”). 
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as administrative searches, border searches, and searches of 
closely regulated industries.328 
Justice Scalia wrote six special needs decisions while on the 
Court; in four of them he found for the government and in two he 
found for the individual.329 Unlike in other Fourth Amendment 
cases, where Scalia avoided balancing tests at all costs, in special 
needs cases he occasionally embraced them.330 Scholars have noted 
that the dispositive issues for Justice Scalia in special needs cases 
appeared to be (1) whether there was a real, documented special 
need behind the policy, and (2) whether the search was in a civil 
context or predominately geared towards ordinary criminal wrong-
doing.331 In special needs cases that dealt largely with civil issues, 
Justice Scalia appeared to be more amenable to using balancing 
tests. But where the issue was whether a search sought criminal 
wrongdoing, Justice Scalia was less open to balancing policy inter-
ests, and instead utilized his rule-based approach. 
Two cases involving urinalysis drug tests—National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab and Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton—illustrate the first of those issues: whether there is a docu-
mented special need behind the policy.332 In Von Raab, Justice 
Scalia explicitly engaged in a balancing analysis.333 There, the ma-
jority held that it was reasonable for the U.S. Customs Service to 
randomly drug test its employees without a warrant and without 
probable cause.334 The majority weighed the government’s inter-
 
 328. Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 294–95. 
 329. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding for 
the individual); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 91–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding for the govern-
ment); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (finding for the government); 
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(finding for the individual); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (finding for the 
government); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding 
for the government). 
 330. See Manning, supra note 3, at 767–68 (noting that in special needs cases, Scalia 
“acted on a perceived invitation to exercise the kind of common law discretion he presumed 
judges generally should not have”). 
 331. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 221–26 (noting one distinguishing factor in 
Scalia’s special needs cases was whether the search was for ordinary law enforcement pur-
poses); Kannar, supra note 116, at 1338–42 (distinguishing cases based on whether there 
was a documented special need). 
 332. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662–63; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 333. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 334. Id. at 677 (majority opinion). 
BLOOM 553 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2021  9:09 AM 
752 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:713 
 
ests against the individuals’ interests and found that the govern-
ment’s interest in public safety outweighed the individuals’ privacy 
interests.335 
Justice Scalia dissented.336 But his issue was not with the bal-
ancing analysis. In fact, he endorsed it: he wrote that while there 
were “some absolutes” in Fourth Amendment law, “as soon as those 
have been left behind . . . the question comes down to whether a 
particular search has been ‘reasonable,’ [and] the answer depends 
largely on the social necessity that prompts the search.”337 
Scalia dissented instead because he found that the case lacked 
“real evidence of a real problem” of drug use among customs offi-
cials.338 He noted that the government had failed to show even one 
example in which a customs employee used drugs and that use 
caused him to accept bribes, reveal classified information, or com-
mit any other misconduct.339 Thus, Scalia found that the alleged 
policy interest behind the search did not exist, and therefore the 
search was not reasonable.340 
Vernonia also dealt with urinalysis drug tests, but Justice Scalia 
came out in favor of the testing.341 There, a district-wide policy al-
lowed random drug tests of student athletes in a school district in 
Oregon.342 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first noted that 
there was no clear practice either approving or disapproving of 
urine tests for public school students in 1791.343 He then proceeded 
to balance the individual interests against the government’s.344 He 
noted that the case involved a supervisory relationship between 
children and their schoolteachers, similar to in loco parentis.345 He 
 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 680–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 337. Id. He cited. T.L.O. as an example, and noted that there, the search was appropriate 
because drug use in schools had become a serious social problem. Id. (citing New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)). 
 338. Id. at 681. 
 339. Id. at 683. 
 340. Id. at 683–84. 
 341. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658, 662–63 (1995). 
 342. Id. at 650. 
 343. Id. at 652–53. 
 344. Id.  
 345. Id. at 654–55. Justice Scalia noted that the supervisory relationship here was akin 
to the one between a man on probation and his probation officer in Griffin v. Wisconsin. Id. 
(citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). 
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wrote that to determine whether a search is “reasonable,” one must 
take that relationship into account.346 He described the manner in 
which urine samples were collected—male students used a urinal 
and were observed from behind; female students produced a sam-
ple in a stall with a female monitor standing outside—and found 
the privacy interests “negligible.”347 On the other side, he found 
that the interest in deterring drug use among school children was 
great, and that student athletes were at a particularly high risk of 
harm if they used drugs.348 He cited the district court’s finding that 
not only was drug use a serious problem in Vernonia schools, but 
that student athletes were among the strongest users.349 Not only 
did he do a balancing analysis, but he referenced the test from Katz 
v. United States, writing that student athletes have even lesser ex-
pectations of privacy because they are accustomed to using public 
locker rooms and because they have voluntarily chosen to join a 
sports team and subject themselves to greater regulation.350 
Though both Vernonia and Von Raab dealt with urinalysis drug 
tests, Justice Scalia explained the divergence in his opinions: in 
Von Raab there was no evidence that customs officials were using 
drugs, but in Vernonia there was an “immediate crisis” of students 
indulging in drug use.351 As Professor George Kannar noted, these 
cases exhibit one of the dispositive issues in special needs cases for 
Scalia: whether there was, in fact, a documented special need.352 
That need must be more than a mere policy interest, but rather 
must include a “demonstrated basis for a policy.”353  
 
 346. Id. at 656 (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial 
and tutelary responsibility for children.”). 
 347. Id. at 658. 
 348. Id. at 662. 
 349. Id. at 648–49. 
 350. Id. at 657–58; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (expectations of privacy). Professor MacDonnell noted that in Vernonia, 
Scalia clearly deviated from his originalist approach, electing instead to use the Katz test. 
See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 222. 
 351. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
681 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting). The district court found that “a large segment of the stu-
dent body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion, 
that disciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions, and that the rebellion was being 
fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student’s misperceptions about the drug 
culture.” Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662–63 (quoting district court opinion) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 352. Kannar, supra note 116, at 1338–42. 
 353. Id. at 1342. 
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Justice Scalia’s dissents in two other special needs cases—Fer-
guson v. City of Charleston and Maryland v. King—address the 
second issue: whether the primary purpose of the search was ordi-
nary criminal wrongdoing.354 In Ferguson, the majority held that 
warrantless urinalysis tests of pregnant women by a state hospital 
without their consent violated the Fourth Amendment.355 The ma-
jority found that the primary purpose of the policy was to detect 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and thus the special needs excep-
tion did not apply.356 
Justice Scalia dissented. He endorsed the lower court’s finding 
that the primary purpose of the urine tests was to protect both 
mothers and their unborn children, and noted that the finding was 
binding upon the Court unless it was clearly erroneous.357 He com-
pared the doctors in that case to the probation officers in Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, and argued that they were concerned with public wel-
fare, not law enforcement.358 Thus, he argued that the special 
needs doctrine applied.359 
In contrast, in King, Justice Scalia argued that the search did 
not seek anything beyond ordinary criminal wrongdoing and there-
fore the special needs exception did not apply.360 King dealt with 
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited collecting DNA swabs 
from people arrested on felony charges.361 The majority engaged in 
a balancing test and found that the government interest (the need 
for law enforcement to safely and accurately identify people in cus-
tody)362 outweighed the “minimal” privacy intrusion of having one’s 
cheek swabbed for DNA.363 
 
 354. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 470 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. City 
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 98 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 355. 532 U.S. at 86 (majority opinion). 
 356. Id. at 81–84. 
 357. Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 358. Id. at 101. 
 359. Id. at 98. 
 360. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 470 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 361. Id. at 440–41 (majority opinion). 
 362. In addition, the majority cited the need to ascertain an arrestee’s identity and crim-
inal history—in order to assess their level of dangerousness—as another government inter-
est. Id. at 459–50. 
 363. Id. at 449, 461, 465–66. 
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Justice Scalia dissented, refusing to engage in a balancing anal-
ysis.364 He stated that balancing analyses were only appropriate in 
special needs cases where the primary purpose was not detecting 
criminal wrongdoing.365 Here, he argued that the primary purpose 
was to seek ordinary criminal wrongdoing: police were using the 
DNA data to tie arrestees to other, unsolved crimes.366 The lag in 
time between the arrest and the DNA results showed that the pur-
pose could not possibly be merely to identify who was in custody.367 
That purpose could be accomplished through standard fingerprint-
ing.368 He ended his dissent on a forceful note: “I doubt that the 
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been 
so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”369 
The divergence between Ferguson and King can be drawn on 
whether the primary purpose of the search was to uncover ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing.370 In instances where the purpose of the 
search was a civil issue, Scalia had no objection to warrantless 
searches without probable cause. But where the search sought to 
uncover criminal wrongdoing, Scalia objected. In King, he noted 
that no matter the result of a balancing analysis, a suspicionless 
search would never be appropriate if its subject was ordinary crim-
inal wrongdoing.371 And in Ferguson, he noted that the “social judg-
ment” was irrelevant—policy issues should be dealt with by the 
legislature.372 
 
 364. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicion-
less searches are never allowed . . . [for] ordinary crime-solving.”). 
 365. Id. at 468. 
 366. Id. at 470. 
 367. Id. at 471–76. 
 368. Id. at 480. 
 369. Id. at 482. 
 370. See id. at 469; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 98 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 371. 569 U.S. at 469. 
 372. 532 U.S. at 92. 
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B.  Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations 
In cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, 
Justice Scalia seemed to abandon his verve for limited judicial dis-
cretion. In this area he unapologetically used balancing tests and 
decided cases based on the “substantial social costs.”373 
Murray v. United States is an early indication of Justice Scalia’s 
concern with the exclusionary rule.374 There, police broke into a 
warehouse, saw bales of marijuana, then left and got a warrant 
without using the fact that they had already entered the ware-
house and seen the marijuana.375 Writing for the majority, Scalia 
held that the marijuana should not be suppressed because alt-
hough the original search was unlawful, the search pursuant to the 
valid warrant was an independent source.376 Justice Marshall dis-
sented, pointing out that this would provide an incentive for offic-
ers to conduct illegal searches and then get warrants afterwards.377 
He wrote that the majority’s holding “severely undermine[d] the 
deterrence function of the exclusionary rule.”378 
Justice Scalia’s disdain for the exclusionary rule crystalized in 
Hudson v. Michigan.379 Writing for the majority, he cited policy is-
sues to justify not applying the exclusionary rule.380 In Hudson, 
police executed a search warrant at the house of Booker Hudson, 
searching for drugs and firearms.381 When officers arrived at Mr. 
Hudson’s home, they announced their presence, but waited only 
“three to five seconds” before opening his unlocked door.382 Mr. 
Hudson argued that the evidence obtained should be suppressed 
because the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule.383 
 
 373. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
638 (1987); see Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 296 (noting the real curiosity of Scalia’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that he did not provide for a remedy); Stras et al., 
supra note 5, at 763 (“When you look to the remedy, he seemed to not necessarily be the 
friend of criminal defendants . . . .”). 
 374. 487 U.S. 533, 536–37 (1988). 
 375. Id. at 535–36. 
 376. Id. at 538. 
 377. Id. at 546 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 378. Id. 
 379. 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 588. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 588–89. 
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Michigan conceded that the knock-and-announce rule had been vi-
olated, but argued that exclusion of the evidence was too great a 
remedy.384 
Justice Scalia agreed. He noted that the exclusionary rule gen-
erated “‘substantial social costs’ . . . which sometimes include set-
ting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”385 He also worried 
that excluding evidence distorted the truth-finding process be-
cause it suppressed reliable evidence.386 He proceeded to balance 
the deterrence benefits the exclusionary rule provided against the 
social costs in the case.387 The deterrence benefits, he found, were 
miniscule: law enforcement officials had little incentive to violate 
the knock-and-announce rule as they already had a search war-
rant.388 Thus, deterrence was not paramount.389 In contrast, the 
social costs were high: they would include not only releasing dan-
gerous criminals, but also inviting a flood of litigation regarding 
the knock-and-announce rule.390  
Further, Scalia noted that while perhaps in 1961 the exclusion-
ary rule was a necessary deterrent because Dollree Mapp391 could 
not file a § 1983 claim, now there were other remedies besides the 
exclusionary rule.392 Victims of Fourth Amendment violations 
could now file claims under § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,393 and moreover, 
they could find attorneys to represent them in such cases because 
Congress had authorized attorney’s fees for civil rights plaintiffs.394 
Further, Scalia had confidence in law enforcement and did not 
think deterrence was necessary. He wrote that there is now “in-
creasing evidence that police forces across the United States take 
the constitutional rights of citizens seriously” and stated that 
“modern police forces are staffed with professionals.”395 He thought 
 
 384. Id. at 590. 
 385. Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 594. 
 388. Id. at 596–97. 
 389. Id. at 596. 
 390. Id. at 595. 
 391. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 392. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597. 
 393. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 394. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98. 
 395. Id. at 599. 
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that the threat of internal discipline for police officers would be a 
significant enough deterrent.396 After explicitly balancing these 
factors, Justice Scalia found in favor of the government.397 He con-
sidered the “massive remedy” of the exclusionary rule unjustified 
and thought other remedies, such as civil suits, were more appro-
priate.398 
But when faced with these civil suits, Justice Scalia denied re-
covery again and again. He wrote a total of eight Bivens and § 1983 
Fourth Amendment decisions and found for the government in all 
but one of them.399 And in these decisions, he frequently used bal-
ancing tests. 
For example, in Anderson v. Creighton, Justice Scalia held that 
FBI agents were entitled to qualified immunity after they violated 
an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.400 There, agents 
searched the Creighton family’s home without a warrant.401 The 
Creighton family was not the target of the search; rather, the agent 
believed that a man suspected of bank robbery might be there, but 
he was not.402 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the agents 
were entitled to qualified immunity; they could not be held person-
ally liable for the violation.403 He balanced the interests on both 
sides, noting that civil damages were often the only realistic rem-
edy for constitutional violations.404 On the other hand, though, he 
wrote that allowing suits against government officials would lead 
 
 396. Id. at 598–99. 
 397. Id. at 599. 
 398. Id. at 598–99. 
 399. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 767 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (finding for the government); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 
397 (2007) (finding for the government); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (finding 
for the government); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia J., concurring) 
(finding for the government); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994) (finding for the 
government); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (finding for the individual); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599–600 (1989) 
(finding for the government); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (finding for the government); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (find-
ing for the government). 
 400. 483 U.S. at 637–41. 
 401. Id. at 637. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 641. 
 404. Id. at 638. 
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to “substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal 
monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit offi-
cials in the discharge of their duties.”405 He noted that qualified 
immunity addressed this concern and that it should be applied as 
long as the official’s actions were objectively “reasonable.”406 He re-
lied not on textualism or originalism, but on precedent, and una-
pologetically stated that the doctrine of qualified immunity “re-
flects a balance that has been struck ‘across the board.’”407 
The plaintiffs put forward an originalist argument, pointing out 
that at common law officers were strictly liable if they searched an 
innocent third party’s home for a fugitive who was not present.408 
Justice Scalia rejected this argument, calling it “procrustean.”409 
He stated that “we have never suggested that the precise contours 
of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the 
often arcane rules of the common law.”410 
Scholars have pointed out how much this opinion contradicts 
Scalia’s commitment to originalism. Professor MacDonnell noted 
that Anderson is not only inconsistent with Scalia’s originalist ap-
proach, but seems to “dismiss core tenants of originalism.”411 Pro-
fessor Kerr also stated that he had struggled to reconcile Anderson 
with Scalia’s originalist views, and wondered if it came out that 
way because it was only Scalia’s first term.412 
Anderson not only betrayed Justice Scalia’s originalism, but it 
also failed to limit judicial discretion. Because he did not root the 
decision in originalism or textualism, Scalia decided the case by 
balancing interests.413 It is unclear how Justice Scalia would or 
could have distinguished this decision from the legislating from the 
bench that he claimed to abhor. 
 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 642. 
 408. Id. at 644. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. at 645. 
 411. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 230. 
 412. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 764. In 2011, though, Justice Scalia reaffirmed the 
holding from Anderson in his decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
 413. 483 U.S. at 642. 
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Another civil suit where Scalia explicitly balanced individual 
and state interests was Scott v. Harris.414 There, officers and Victor 
Harris were involved in a high-speed car chase.415 When Mr. Har-
ris did not follow officers’ directives to pull over, Officer Scott 
bumped his vehicle into Mr. Harris’s, causing him to spin off the 
road, flip over, and crash.416 As a result, Mr. Harris was rendered 
a quadriplegic.417 
Mr. Harris filed a § 1983 action, asserting that Officer Scott used 
excessive force which resulted in an unreasonable seizure and thus 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.418 Mr. Harris argued that 
the Court should apply the bright-line rule from Tennessee v. Gar-
ner: use of deadly force is only reasonable when officers have prob-
able cause to believe (1) the suspect “poses[] an immediate threat 
of serious physical harm,” and (2) “deadly force must have been 
necessary to prevent escape.”419 Justice Scalia commended Mr. 
Harris’s attempt to craft a clear test, but stated that instead of ap-
plying it, the Court “must still slosh [its] way through the fact-
bound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”420 Here, he was not enthusiastic 
about a bright-line rule based on probable cause because it was in 
the context of a civil remedy, not a criminal case.421 
Instead, he turned to a balancing test. On Mr. Harris’s side, 
Scalia noted the high likelihood of serious injury or death that Of-
ficer Scott caused by bumping into Mr. Harris’s car.422 On the gov-
ernment’s side, he pointed out the actual and imminent threat that 
Mr. Harris’s driving posed to pedestrians, civil motorists, and the 
officers involved in the chase.423 Justice Scalia posed the question 
of how the Court should weigh “the perhaps lesser probability of 
injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger 
 
 414. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Orin Kerr stated that Scott v. Harris was an 
example of where Scalia could find no alternative to considering the totality of the circum-
stances. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 769. 
 415. 550 U.S. at 374–75. 
 416. Id. at 375. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. at 375–76. 
 419. Id. at 381–82 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). 
 420. Id. at 383. 
 421. See supra section I.B. 
 422. Harris, 550 U.S. at 384. 
 423. Id. at 383–84. 
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probability of injuring or killing a single person.”424 Scalia decided 
that the Court should take into account the “relative culpability” 
of the lives at risk.425 Mr. Harris, he argued, had caused the risk 
by engaging in the high-speed chase in the first place—and that 
was dispositive on the issue.426 Thus, Scalia found that Officer 
Scott’s actions were reasonable. He laid down a rule: “A police of-
ficer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that 
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at 
risk of serious injury or death.”427 
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the determination of 
whether the seizure was “reasonable” should have been left to the 
jury.428 Justice Stevens noted that in the video of the incident, it 
was not clear whether there were even any pedestrians on the road 
who would have been at risk of injury.429 Further, he noted that 
the chase was “hardly the stuff of Hollywood” and there were not 
any “close calls” in which innocent bystanders could have been in-
jured.430 Justice Stevens criticized the general rule that Scalia had 
put forth, arguing that it was not clear that Mr. Harris’s conduct 
had threatened the lives of any innocent bystanders.431 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout his career, Justice Scalia was adamant about using 
bright-line rules instead of fuzzy standards. He was especially in-
tentional about using rules when dealing with criminal matters, 
 
 424. Id. at 384. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. Earlier in the opinion, Scalia described the incident as a “Hollywood-style car 
chase of the most frightening sort.” Id. at 380. 
 427. Id. at 386. The concurring Justices disagreed, though, about whether the holding 
constituted a per se rule. Justice Breyer stated that he disagreed with the majority insofar 
as it articulated a per se rule, arguing that statement of the holding was too absolute. Id. at 
389 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, though, noted that she did not consider the 
majority’s holding a “mechanical, per se rule.” Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She cited 
the Court’s balancing analysis, and argued that the inquiry was fact specific and did not lay 
down a clear test. Id. 
 428. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 429. Id. at 392–93. 
 430. Id. at 392. 
 431. Id. at 396. 
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believing that rules could help protect the rights of unpopular crim-
inal defendants. 
And yet, in cases involving civil special needs as well as remedies 
for Fourth Amendment violations, Justice Scalia seemed to aban-
don his enthusiasm for rules. In these cases, he used standards 
that allowed for unbridled judicial discretion in balancing individ-
ual and government interests. He used balancing tests that let 
judges impute their own subjective preferences onto the law under 
the veneer of objectivity.432  
Further, in these cases, Justice Scalia almost always sided with 
the government. Indeed, scholars have pointed out that when 
courts use balancing tests, the government usually wins.433 In civil 
special needs cases, Justice Scalia sided with the government as 
long as the search was not directed at criminal evidence. When 
dealing with remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, he 
chipped away at the exclusionary rule, arguing that police officers 
were “professionals” who did not need the deterrent effect of sup-
pression.434 He argued there were better remedies, like civil suits, 
and yet when faced with those civil suits he repeatedly granted of-
ficers qualified immunity.435 Finally, though Justice Scalia pro-
fessed to take seriously the rights of unpopular criminal defend-
ants,436 his decision in Scott v. Harris—albeit a civil case— seemed 
 
 432. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment 
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 239 (1993) (“The very concept of balancing suggests that the 
Court must develop some objective measure for this task. It has never done so, leaving these 
opinions open to the criticism that the Justices are imposing their subjective preferences, 
while pretending that these judgments are the product of some neutral, objective, almost 
scientific process.”). 
 433. E.g., Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 297 (“In reality, the Court’s idea of ‘bal-
ancing’ is illusory—the test is rigged such that the government almost always wins.”); 
Cloud, supra note 432, at 280 (noting that in Fourth Amendment balancing cases, collective 
government interests tend to outweigh individual privacy interests); Strossen, supra note 
15, at 1176 (arguing the Court overvalues government interests in balancing tests); T. Al-
exander Aleinkoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987) 
(“Balancing has been a vehicle primarily for weakening earlier categorical doctrines restrict-
ing governmental power to search and seize.”). But see Sullivan, supra note 3, at 95–97 
(arguing there is no “conservative” or “liberal” bent to the choice of rules versus standards). 
 434. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006). 
 435. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (qualified immunity for officer 
who conducts warrantless search); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 744 (2011) (qualified 
immunity for attorney general after arresting and detaining terrorism suspects using ma-
terial witness warrants but with improper motive). 
 436. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1180. 
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to depart from that rationale and had no problem taking into ac-
count the “relative culpability”437 of the lives at risk. 
Justice Scalia’s lasting impact in insisting on a rule over a stand-
ard may be his reintroduction of the trespass approach to the 
Fourth Amendment. Especially as we move forward into the digital 
age, the trespass approach may offer a clearer rule showing when 
a search has occurred, alleviating the need to rely only on the open-
ended standard from Katz v. United States. Justice Gorsuch stated 
as much in his dissent in Carpenter v. United States: “These an-
cient principles may help us address modern data cases too.”438 Not 
only has Justice Gorsuch argued to build on the reintroduced tres-
pass test, but a substantial majority of the current Court has ac-
cepted its revival. 
 
 
 437. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007). 
 438. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
